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“Every thing is worth what its purchaser will pay for it.”
—Publius Syrus1
INTRODUCTION
In less than a decade, the annual value of appraisal claims in Delaware has
increased tenfold over historical levels.2 The driving force behind this growth
has been the emergence of an investment strategy known as appraisal arbitrage.3
Appraisal arbitrageurs buy a target company’s shares after the announcement of
a merger, oppose the transaction, and then make—or threaten to make—an
appraisal claim in order to capture a value greater than the merger price.4 Because
of the development and growth of this investment strategy, the “appraisal remedy
has been transformed from a forgettable attribute of stock ownership” into a
viable mechanism for challenging opportunistic mergers.5 Thus, absent further
legislative reform or a shift in the Delaware Court of Chancery’s approach to
appraisal, the appraisal remedy stands to remain an important part of the
framework for ensuring corporate accountability going forward.
Much noise has been made concerning the development of “buying into”
a lawsuit. On the one hand, some scholars have embraced appraisal arbitrage,
viewing its development as a net positive.6 They argue that decisions to
initiate appraisal proceedings are correlated to litigation merit and can serve
as a safeguard against poor sales processes.7 Nonrobust sales processes,
including those that lack a market auction, may not result in the highest price
possible, and indeed, the transactions targeted for appraisal proceedings tend
to have unusually low premia.8 As such, appraisal suits may actually be
initiated when target shareholders are receiving too little consideration for
their shares. On the other hand, deal lawyers unsurprisingly have been vocal
1 PUBLIUS SYRUS, THE MORAL SAYINGS OF PUBLIUS SYRUS, A ROMAN SLAVE 71 (D. Lyman,
Jr. trans., Cleveland, L.E. Barnard & Co. 1856) (46-29 BC).
2 See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company
M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2015) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage]
(noting the rise in value of appraisal claims to $1.5 billion in 2013, a “tenfold increase from 2004”).
3 See id. (discussing the development and staggering growth of “specialized investment strategies
based on appraisal”).
4 See Philip Richter et al., The Rise of Delaware Appraisal Arbitrage: A Survey of Cases and Some
Practical Implications, INSIGHTS, July 2014, at 18 (describing the mechanics of appraisal arbitrage).
5 Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation 1 (Brooklyn Law Sch.
Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 431, 2016) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation],
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2712088 [https://perma.cc/773H-VFAL].
6 See, e.g., Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1555 (concluding from empirical
evidence that appraisal arbitrage is, on the whole, a “beneficial development”).
7 See id. at 1554-55 (discussing the additional control, and risk, that appraisal arbitrageurs have
when bringing their claims, as opposed to plaintiffs’ attorneys).
8 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5 (noting that “[a]ppraisal petitions are
associated with deals that have abnormally low merger premia”).
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critics of this practice.9 They argue that the mere threat of appraisal litigation
stands to reduce the number of beneficial deals that are closed and to block
shareholders from capturing higher value in transactions that are actually
consummated.10 Under this view, the possibility of appraisal litigation causes
potential acquirers to offer lower bids and require restrictive closing conditions
in order to account for potential litigation costs and the uncertain outcome of
an appraisal proceeding, leading to deal failures and lower purchase prices.11
Both sides of this debate have called on the Delaware legislature to reform
its appraisal statute.12 Scholars who approve of the appraisal remedy have
suggested a number of amendments that would expand and, in their view,
improve the appraisal process.13 Deal lawyers, conversely, have advocated for the
Delaware legislature to restrict appraisal rights by denying them to shareholders
who purchase shares after the record date for the merger vote.14 Currently, the
relevant date for entitlement to appraisal rights is the closing date of the
transaction. Transactional advisors claim that reforming that date will
prevent appraisal arbitrageurs from having the option to wait and then “buy
into” a lawsuit if there are developments between the record date and the

9 See, e.g., Trevor S. Norwitz, Delaware Legislature Should Act to Curb Appraisal Arbitrage Abuses,
COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 10, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/02/10
/delaware-legislature-should-act-to-curb-appraisal-arbitrage-abuses/ [https://perma.cc/U4X3-5ZZJ] (arguing
that there is an “urgent need for legislative reform in Delaware to ameliorate the risk that appraisal
arbitrage—now a multibillion dollar industry—poses to transactional vitality and shareholder value”).
10 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 3-4 (distilling the arguments
commonly made by those who favor amending the appraisal statute).
11 Korsmo and Myers make just this point, stating, “Merger agreements might cabin appraisal
liability by including a closing condition allowing the acquirer to walk away if more than some
specified percentage of stockholders demands appraisal, but that solution is unattractive to sellers
(because it reduces the certainty of the deal) and also to buyers (because it allows dissenting
stockholders to veto the transaction). The result of this uncertainty, in the transactional advisors view,
is that acquirers facing potential appraisal liability will lower their bid to account for the expectation
of an appraisal suit, and non-dissenting stockholders will be penalized by this holdback.” Id. at 4.
12 See, e.g., id. at 5 (suggesting expansion and improvement of the statutory remedy rather
than its curtailment); Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, Davis Polk & Wardell LLP,
Latham & Watkins LLP, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
LLP, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP & Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Council of the Corporate
Law Section, Del. State Bar Ass’n & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Ruby R. Vale Professor of Corp. &
Bus. Law, Widener’s Inst. of Del. Corp. Law 2-3 (Apr. 1, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Seven Firm Letter] (calling for amendment of the Delaware appraisal statute).
13 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 5 (suggesting that Delaware
policymakers “consider a number of amendments to expand and improve the appraisal remedy:
eliminating the exception for all-stock transactions, introducing a de minimis exception, and
requiring more disclosure from companies so that stockholders are in a position to make an informed
decision about exercising their appraisal rights”).
14 See Seven Firm Letter, supra note 12, at 2 (arguing that there is “no justification for
permitting holders who purchased their shares after the record date for the vote to seek appraisal as
if they were ‘dissenters’”).
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closing date that arbitrageurs believe would increase a court’s determination of
the fair value of their shares.15
Delaware’s Corporation Law Council (the Council), the body responsible
for suggesting amendments to the corporate code to the Delaware legislature,16
heard these cries for reform and proposed two amendments to the appraisal statute
in the spring of 2015.17 First, the Council suggested a de minimis requirement in
order to eliminate nuisance suits. Under that proposal, shareholders seeking
appraisal would have to collectively hold at least one percent of total shares
outstanding or one million dollars’ worth of shares.18 Second, the Council
proposed a provision intended to offset the potential economic incentive created
by the interest owed to successful appraisal plaintiffs. Specifically, the amendment
sought to allow the acquiring company “at any time before the court enters
judgment in an appraisal action, . . . [to] pay to each stockholder seeking appraisal
rights an amount of cash, with interest continuing to accrue only on the amount
that is the difference between that cash payment and the court’s ultimate award.”19
The Delaware legislature did not adopt these amendments in 2015.20 The Council
then issued substantially the same suggestions in the spring of 2016, only adding
that the de minimis requirement should not apply to parent/subsidiary mergers
approved under section 253 or 267 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL).21 The legislature responded by approving the addition of these
amendments on June 8, 2016.22
In this Comment, I argue that further calls for reform to the appraisal
remedy should be aimed at the Delaware Court of Chancery. The purpose of
this Comment is not to express a normative judgment about the overall
15 See, e.g., Norwitz, supra note 9 (deeming this phenomenon the “‘heads-I-win-tails-I-don’tlose’ option for arbitrageurs”).
16 See About the Section of Corporation Law, DEL. ST. B. ASS’N (2016), http://www.dsba.org/sectionscommittees/sections-of-the-bar/corporation-law/ [https://perma.cc/BBR9-B9VJ] (discussing the responsibilities
of the Council, including recommending amendments to the Delaware corporate code).
17 See Proposed 2015 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law, WILSON SONSINI
GOODRICH & ROSATI (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=
publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-DCGL.htm [https://perma.cc/S7CF-2FLF] (summarizing the Council’s
proposed amendments to the DGCL, including those targeting appraisal rights).
18 See id. (describing the Council’s first proposed amendment).
19 Id.
20 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 36 (“In an unusual turn, the
amendments proposed by the Council were never introduced in the Delaware legislature.”).
21 See Allison L. Land et al., Proposed Delaware General Corporation Law Amendments Would
Address Appraisal Proceedings, Short-Form Mergers, Court of Chancery Jurisdiction, SKADDEN, ARPS,
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.skadden.com/insights/proposed-dgclamendments-would-address-appraisal-proceedings-short-form-mergers-court-of-chancery-jurisdiction
[https://perma.cc/EU5A-9AGN] (discussing the Council’s proposed amendments for 2016).
22 David Shine et al., Delaware Legislature Acts to Limit Appraisal Rights, STAY CURRENT (Paul
Hastings LLP, Los Angeles, Cal.), May 2016, https://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/PDFs/
stay-current-delaware-legislature-acts-to-limit-appraisal-rights-(june-15).pdf [https://perma.cc/R7NA-FUL7].

2016]

Relying on Merger Price

157

desirability of appraisal arbitrage; rather, I propose a shift away from the
Chancery Court’s oft-favored valuation technique, discounted cash flow (DCF)
analysis,23 in appraisal cases arising out of certain third-party, or arm’s-length,
transactions. The Chancery Court should instead rely on merger price as the
best estimate of the “fair value”24 of an appraisal petitioner’s shares when (1)
the inputs required for a DCF analysis are unreliable and (2) there has been a
genuine market test.
Reliance on the merger price under these conditions would allay concerns
on both sides of the debate. For proponents of appraisal arbitrage, this valuation
approach does not impinge on shareholders’ ability to resort to the appraisal
remedy by restricting their deadline to the record date. Additionally, the
Chancery Court’s embrace of merger price would incentivize additional
disclosure by target companies in order to demonstrate that the sale process
was fulsome.25 For opponents of appraisal arbitrage, when there has been a
genuine market test and a DCF analysis is unreliable, the use of merger price
punishes appraisal petitioners when their claims are unwarranted (i.e., purely
speculative investments aimed at low-premium transactions). Appraisal
arbitrageurs cannot profit from “buying into” a lawsuit when the merger price
is used as fair value; they must bear litigation expenses and additionally may
face a “synergy deduction,” as appraisal claimants cannot capture any value
arising from the expectation of the merger.26 Thus, this approach to valuation
would only encourage claims where there is real reason to believe that the price
achieved in the merger was not “fair”—namely, in controlling shareholder and
parent/subsidiary mergers—and would remove some uncertainty from thirdparty mergers (the transactions that are the primary focus of M&A lawyers).
Following a description of the history and purpose of the appraisal statute
and the mechanics of an appraisal suit in Part I, Part II of this Comment
23 See, e.g., In re Orchard Enter., No. 5713-CS, 2012 WL 2923305, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012)
(“The proper way to value the petitioners’ shares is to value Orchard as a going concern . . . . This
approach marries perfectly with the DCF method of valuation, which is based on the notion that a
corporation’s value equals the present value of its future cash flows. By allocating the DCF value of
Orchard in accordance with the dividend formula in the Certificate of Designations . . . the mandate
of 8 Del. C. § 262 to award the petitioners ‘the fair value of [their] shares’ is faithfully implemented.”
(footnote omitted)).
24 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016).
25 This approach is similar to a proposed statutory “safe harbor from appraisal claims where [a
target company] can demonstrate that the merger price was subjected to a genuine market test.”
Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1608. The proposed reliance on merger price
advocated by this Comment, however, requires that the DCF inputs be unreliable, which can occur
in situations like those discussed in Part III, infra.
26 See § 262(h) (“Through such proceeding the Court shall determine the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair
value.” (emphasis added)).
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provides an overview of the recent emergence and growth of appraisal claims
and discusses factors that may have contributed to this increase. While none
of these factors alone seems to explain the rise in appraisal claims, when taken
together, they indicate that unless there are further legislative or judicial
restrictions, appraisal arbitrageurs will persist in employing the remedy in
order to check—or profit from—third-party mergers. Part III addresses the
Chancery Court’s historical approach to determining fair value, as well as its
increasing willingness to use merger price as the best evidence of fair value.27
This Part also discusses the need to calculate synergies if merger price is to
be used to find fair value, given that section 262(h) of the DGCL requires fair
value to be determined exclusive of any value arising from the merger.28
Although a legal framework for this calculation is not well-established, it is a
feasible calculation for parties and the court to make. Part IV discusses the
Chancery Court’s decision in LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron International
Corp.,29 a case in which appraisal arbitrage and the court’s use of merger price
to determine fair value dovetail. Longpath exemplifies not only a situation where
the use of DCF analysis is inappropriate, but also illustrates the need to develop
a robust analytical framework for valuing synergies. This Part also addresses the
Chancery Court’s recent appraisal decisions in In re Appraisal of Dell Inc.30 and In
re Appraisal of DFC Global Corp.,31 in which the court did not rely exclusively on
merger price, and explains why these decisions are not inconsistent with this
Comment’s ultimate argument. Finally, in Part V, I propose a framework for
when the Chancery Court should rely on merger price as the best evidence of
fair value in appraisal proceedings, namely, when there has been a genuine
market test and the inputs for a DCF analysis are unreliable.

27 See, e.g., LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443,
at *20 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (“[I]n the situation of a proper transactional process likely to have
resulted in an accurate valuation of an acquired corporation, this Court has looked to the merger
price as evidence of fair value and, on occasion, given that metric one-hundred percent weight.”);
Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., No. 8509-VCN, 2015 WL 2069417, at *16 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30,
2015) (“[B]ecause the Merger price appears to be the best estimate of value, the Court will put full
weight on that price.”); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at
*23 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (finding “fair value in these circumstances best represented by the market
price”); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., No. 6844-VCG, 2013 WL 5878807, at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov.
1, 2013) (deciding, under the circumstances, to “rely on the merger price as the best and most reliable
indication of CKx’s value”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., 847 A.2d 340, 343
(Del. Ch. 2003) (concluding that “the Merger Price is the best evidence of fair value”).
28 See § 262(h) (providing that “the Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation”).
29 2015 WL 4540443.
30 No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016).
31 No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016).
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I. OVERVIEW OF APPRAISAL RIGHTS
Shareholders’ statutory right to appraisal grew out of the shift away from
the traditional requirement that shareholders unanimously consent in order
to proceed with a merger or other fundamental corporate change.32 Although
the unanimity requirement afforded great protection to individual shareholders,
it also gave rise to a holdout problem, as an equity holder with just one share
could block the entire transaction.33 To cure this issue, states amended their
corporate statutes to replace the unanimity requirement with a majority-vote
rule.34 This change increased overall corporate efficiency, but it left minority
shareholders vulnerable to the will of the majority in the context of changes in
corporate control.35 States addressed this new issue by expanding statutory
appraisal rights, which allow dissenting minority shareholders to escape a
transaction approved by the majority.36 More specifically, appraisal rights
permit dissenting shareholders who believe the merger price is inadequate to
petition the court for a determination of the fair value of their shares.37
Because appraisal rights are creatures of state law, they vary by
jurisdiction.38 In Delaware, shareholders must meet certain standing
requirements and take certain affirmative actions in order to exercise their
appraisal rights. To start, the appraisal remedy is only permitted in the
merger context.39 Additionally, for public companies, the availability of

32 See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair
Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 615 (1998) (explaining that the appraisal remedy developed “as a quid pro
quo for the loss of shareholders’ right to veto fundamental corporate changes”).
33 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1558 (describing the “holdout problem”
that arose from unanimous consent requirements); see also George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105
NW. L. REV. 1635, 1642 (2011) (“[A]ny single shareholder could block the deal, and the expansion of
shareholder rosters during [the early twentieth century] raised serious holdout problems . . . .”).
34 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1558 (describing the transition from
a unanimity requirement to majority-vote rule).
35 See id. (noting that the change to majority-voting “stripped minority shareholders of protection
against majority expropriation”); see also Geis, supra note 33, at 1642-43 (explaining that the shift away
from the unanimity requirement “led to concerns that majority owners could trample over the interests
of minority shareholders—say, by merging with firms engaged in risky or objectionable activity”).
36 See Geis, supra note 33, at 1643 (“A merger could move forward with less-than-unanimous
approvals, but minority owners had an escape if they disliked the shift in direction.”).
37 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1558-59 (“Appraisal affords
minority shareholders who object to a fundamental transaction the opportunity to exit from the
enterprise on terms set by a judge . . . .”).
38 States that have adopted the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) have the same or
similar appraisal remedies. See id. at 1559 (discussing the broad availability of appraisal in MBCA states).
In this Comment, I focus on the Delaware appraisal statute, given that more than fifty percent of all
publicly traded companies in the United States are incorporated in Delaware. Division of Corporations: About
Agency, ST. DEL., http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml [https://perma.cc/T6A3-GG5H].
39 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1559 (“In Delaware . . . only mergers
give rise to appraisal rights.”).
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appraisal rights depends on the form of the merger consideration: the remedy
exists in an all-cash merger but generally not in a stock-for-stock merger—i.e.,
when shareholders receive relatively liquid equity securities in exchange for their
shares in the target company or any other public company.40 This “market-out
exception,” which denies appraisal rights to minority shareholders, exists when
the merger consideration consists of stock listed on a national securities exchange
or is held by more than 2000 record owners.41 Additionally, to have standing,
a shareholder must be a record stockholder continuously from the time the
appraisal claim is made through the effective date of the merger.42
The 2016 amendments to section 262 imposed an additional standing
requirement. The Court of Chancery must dismiss any appraisal action unless
(1) the number of shares entitled to appraisal is greater than one percent of
the outstanding shares in that class; (2) the merger consideration for the shares
entitled to appraisal is greater than one million dollars; or (3) the transaction
in question is structured as a short-form merger.43 These amendments were
aimed at eliminating appraisal claims having a de minimus amount of money
at stake, while explicitly preserving the appraisal remedy in the short-form
merger context, which the courts historically have viewed with suspicion.44
Shareholders must also comply with a number of affirmative requirements to
perfect their appraisal rights. First, they must deliver a written demand for
appraisal to the company before the merger vote.45 Second, shareholders must
either vote against the transaction or abstain from the vote entirely.46 Finally,
assuming the merger was approved by shareholder vote, the dissenting
shareholders must file a petition seeking appraisal with the Delaware Court of
Chancery within 120 days of the effective date of the merger.47 In contrast to
breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits, there is no class action or fee-shifting mechanism
available in appraisal actions, making appraisal suits riskier for plaintiffs.48
40
41

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2016).
Id. § 262(b)(1); see also Geis, supra note 33, at 1646 (explaining that the “market-out
exception” is premised on the thought that appraisal proceedings would be “a waste of time if
dissenters preserve their equity position while still enjoying an exit option via a public sale”).
42 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2016).
43 Id. § 262(g).
44 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994) (“Entire fairness
remains the proper focus of judicial analysis in examining an interested merger, irrespective of
whether the burden of proof remains upon or is shifted away from the controlling or dominating
shareholder, because the unchanging nature of the underlying ‘interested’ transaction requires
careful scrutiny.”).
45 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (2016).
46 Id. § 262(a).
47 Id. § 262(e).
48 See Richter et al., supra note 4, at 19 (“Importantly, unlike other litigation challenging a deal,
stockholders are unable to proceed as a class and shift attorneys’ fees to stockholders as a whole or
to the defendants.”).

2016]

Relying on Merger Price

161

These procedural hurdles, together with the threat that a court may
determine that the fair value of the plaintiff’s shares is less than the merger
price,49 mean that the incidence of appraisal claims is substantially less than
breach of fiduciary duty claims.50 Nevertheless, due to the factors described in
Section II.A. appraisal plaintiffs are incentivized to bring claims, and the
appraisal remedy will continue to be a means of enforcing corporate
accountability.
II. THE GROWTH OF APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE
Although the statutory appraisal remedy has been available for decades,
activity in this area, once characterized as “a sleepy corporate law backwater,”51
has exploded with the development of appraisal arbitrage as an investment
strategy.52 In the 1960s and 1970s, corporate law scholars were dismissive of the
usefulness of appraisal claims,53 and this view persisted into the twenty-first
century.54 These critics rightly pointed out that transactions simply could be
structured to avoid the appraisal remedy altogether55 and that the process of
seeking appraisal was “chock-full of disadvantages for [dissenting]
shareholders.”56 However, the value of appraisal claims increased tenfold from
2004 to 2013, amounting to nearly $1.5 billion, a figure representing almost “one
percent of the equity value of all merger activity in 2013.”57 Commentators
attribute this exponential growth to appraisal arbitrageurs,58 who tend to be
49 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1561 (explaining that courts “can,
and occasionally do, determine fair value of the plaintiff ’s share to be less than the merger
consideration” (footnote omitted)).
50 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 47 (noting that “[v]irtually every
merger faces a fiduciary duty class action”).
51 Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2.
52 Id.
53 See, e.g., Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Merger and Takeovers,
88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 304 (1974) (referring to appraisal claims as a “last-ditch check on management
improvidence”); Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969) (characterizing appraisal actions as a “remedy
of desperation”); Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE L.J. 223, 260 (1962) (“The appraisal remedy is of virtually no economic advantage to the usual
shareholder except in highly specialized situations.”).
54 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1560 (noting that, as of 2015,
“[a]cademic commentary continue[d] to take a sweepingly dismissive view of appraisal”).
55 Id.
56 Id. (quoting Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 547 (Del. Ch. 2000)); see also id. at 1560-61
(“These disadvantages tend to fall into three categories: (1) the procedural burdens of preserving and
asserting an appraisal remedy; (2) the inability to proceed as a class and shift attorneys’ fees to shareholders
as a whole or to defendants; and (3) the narrow and inflexible nature of the remedy available.”).
57 Id. at 1553.
58 Guarav Jetley & Xinyu Ji, Appraisal Arbitrage—Is There a Delaware Advantage?, 71 BUS. LAW.
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2616887 [https://perma.cc/M7FM-6XZP].
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sophisticated, institutional investors.59 A number of hedge funds have filed
multiple appraisal claims. The largest investor is Merion Capital, which has
invested over $700 million in seven cases since 2010.60 Merion Capital, which
is based in the suburbs of Philadelphia and is led by successful plaintiffs’
lawyer Andrew Barroway, raised a reported one billion dollars for a dedicated
appraisal fund in 2013.61 This investment strategy has proven quite lucrative
for Merion Capital, which “has averaged an 18.5% annualized return across
five completed appraisals, four of which settled” prior to appraisal
proceedings.62 As a point of comparison, the S&P 500 had a 12.9% annualized
return for the period between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2015.63 Hedge
funds, however, are not the only asset managers employing this investment
strategy. Mutual funds and insurance companies, which have traditionally
avoided shareholder litigation, have also filed appraisal petitions.64
A. Factors Influencing the Rise of Appraisal Arbitrage Claims
Commentators have set forth a number of possible reasons for the rise of
appraisal arbitrage, yet none seems to explain the phenomenon on its own;
rather, a confluence of these factors appears to have given rise to the growth
of appraisal petitions.65 Although the purpose of this Comment is not to argue
why appraisal suits have gained popularity, I lay out three factors as potential
explanations. Understanding these factors helps to explain why appraisal arbitrage
suits will continue to be an investment tactic if the status quo remains intact.
First, the Delaware Court of Chancery’s holding in In re Appraisal of
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. opened the door for an increase in appraisal
arbitrage suits by extending the window of time in which investors can buy
target companies’ shares and assert appraisal rights before the effective date of
59 See Korsmo & Meyers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2 (noting that the “explosive growth” in
appraisals has been “driven by sophisticated parties who specialize in bringing appraisal claims”).
60 See id. at 1574-75 (discussing Merion Capital’s appraisal activity).
61 See id. at 1575 (describing the fund and its activities).
62 Liz Hoffman, Judge Rules in Favor of Hedge Fund ‘ Appraisal Arbitrage’ Strategy, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 7, 2015, 1:15 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-rules-in-favor-of-hedge-fund-appraisalarbitrage-strategy-1420571897 [https://perma.cc/PY8H-PC5S].
63 See Compound Annual Growth Rate (Annualized Return), MONEYCHIMP, http://www.moneychimp.
com/features/market_cagr.htm [https://perma.cc/C43H-86WS] (in “Date Range” box, enter “2010” after
“Jan 1” and “2015” after “Dec 31”; then hit “Calculate”) (calculating an annualized return of 12.93%
for that time period).
64 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1575 (noting the recent filing of
appraisal petitions by major mutual funds and insurance companies).
65 See id. at 1582 (“In the end, we can identify no single causative factor to account for the rise
in appraisal arbitrage. We suspect that it may simply be a case of a few investors who, somewhat by
accident, found themselves considering appraisal as a method for salvaging an investment following
a bad merger, became intrigued by the opportunity, and explored it further. As word spread of their
success, others mimicked the strategy.”).
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the merger.66 In Transkaryotic, shareholders owning approximately $400 million
in foregone merger consideration sought appraisal.67 Of the nearly eleven
million shares seeking appraisal, however, about eight million were acquired
after the record date for voting on the merger, but before the actual vote was
held.68 Thus, the legal issue presented by the case, as stated by the court, was
whether “a beneficial shareholder, who purchased shares after the record date
but before the merger vote, [must] prove, by documentation, that each newly
acquired share (i.e., after the record date) is a share not voted in favor of the
merger by the previous beneficial shareholder?”69
The court ruled that the answer to this question was simple: “No.”70 One
oft-cited law firm commentary summarized the holding as follows:
The court ruled that the beneficial holders seeking appraisal did not have to
establish how the specific shares they acquired after the record date were
voted—which the parties to the litigation and the court agreed would be a
practical impossibility. Rather, the Court embraced Cede as the holder of record
and ruled that so long as beneficial owners of fewer than the aggregate number
of Cede shares that were eligible for appraisal (that is, Cede shares either voted
against the merger or not voted) directed Cede to seek appraisal, those shares
would meet the statutory requirement and be eligible for appraisal.71

In short, Transkaryotic gives investors more time to consider whether or
not to bring an appraisal claim. Although some commentators have dismissed
the Transkaryotic decision as having little effect on the frequency of claims,72
others have noted that there is inherent value in being able to delay an

66 See No. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (holding that a beneficial
shareholder who acquires shares after the record date, but before the merger vote, need not prove
by documentation that the previous beneficial owner did not vote the shares in favor of the merger).
67 See id. at *1 (noting that nearly eleven million shares sought appraisal after foregoing merger
consideration of thirty-seven dollars per share).
68 Id.
69 Id. at *3 (emphasis in original); see also Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5,
at 25-26 (“For most publicly traded stock, the record owner is a depository trust such as Cede & Co.,
with purchases and sales on public exchanges merely altering the beneficial ownership of the relevant
shares . . . . [S]tock most [sic] is held by depository trusts in fungible bulk.” (footnote omitted)).
70 Id.
71 Appraisal Arbitrage: Will It Become a New Hedge Fund Strategy?, M&A DEAL COMMENT.
(Latham & Watkins LLP, L.A., Cal.), May 2007, https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub
1883_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC44-LQRH] [hereinafter Latham & Watkins].
72 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1579 (arguing that because the
subset of appraisal actions that were affected by the Transkaryotic ruling did not increase with the
same frequency as those that were not, “whatever legal changes [that] were wrought by the
Transkaryotic decision do not appear to have moved the needle on appraisal activity”).
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investment.73 Indeed, this ability to delay is akin to giving a free call option
to appraisal arbitrageurs.74
The option to delay investment provides a number of advantages to potential
appraisal arbitrageurs, since the court determines fair value as of the time the deal
closes, as opposed to the date of the merger announcement or vote. Take, for
instance, the timeline of a typical deal as diagrammed by Jetley and Ji:75
Record Date:
Eligibility to Vote

Shareholder
Meeting:
Vote on Approval
of Transaction

Definitive Proxy
Materials Mailed
to Shareholders

Public Announcement
of M&A Transaction

Deal
Consummation

tr

ta
Average #
Days
Between
Dates

54 days

tn

5
days

tm

32 days

tc

37 days

The Transkaryotic decision thus extended the time in which investors
could buy shares of the target company from tr to tc, giving appraisal
arbitrageurs, on average, a seventy-four-day call option.76 This option is
valuable because it gives an investor more time to analyze a potential investment.
73 See Jetley & Ji, supra note 58 (manuscript at 6-7) (discussing how the simple ability to delay
investment in a target company allows arbitrageurs to reduce their risk and maximize returns).
74 See id. (manuscript at 7) (“Allowing appraisal arbitrageurs to delay their investment in target
company stock . . . is akin to giving them [a call] option. . . . [A]ppraisal arbitrageurs do not pay for
this option and, thus, the value of the option is essentially a transfer of value from the acquiring
company to the arbitrageurs.”). It is this “free option” that prominent defense law firms have called
upon the Delaware legislature to remove.
75 Id. (manuscript at 18 fig.1).
76 See id. (manuscript at 17) (explaining that in a “typical cash-only friendly transaction . . . the
average time period between the record date and the deal consummation is 74 days”).
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This delay allows an investor “to take advantage of any development[s] or new
information,” such as macroeconomic changes, industry shifts, or companyspecific material from the definitive proxy statement.77 Moreover, postponing
the share purchase may help an investor minimize deal risk, or the probability
that the transaction later falls through.78
A second factor that commentators have pointed to as an explanation for the
increase in appraisal arbitrage activity is the interest rate that is statutorily due to
appraisal petitioners,79 and which is awarded regardless of whether the appraisal
value is higher or lower than the merger price.80 Pursuant to section 262,
appraisal petitioners are owed interest on the value of their shares at “5% over the
Federal Reserve discount rate,” compounded quarterly, using the effective date
of the merger as a starting point.81 Thus, the attractiveness of bringing an
appraisal claim is amplified in an era of historically low interest rates.82
It is unlikely, however, that this disparity between the statutorily imposed
interest rate and the prevailing market interest rate would, in and of itself,
drive the spike in appraisal claims. The statutory interest rate, while attractive
compared to the return on money market funds, is far less than the foregone
equity rate in a robust market.83 The appraisal process is also rife with risk,
as the court may award a fair value that is less than the merger price.84 Returns
77
78
79

Id. (manuscript at 18).
Id.
See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1579-80 (explaining that “in an era
of historically low interest rates, the interest rate available to appraisal petitioners” under the
Delaware appraisal statute may be “attract[ing] investors to appraisal”).
80 Jetley & Ji, supra note 58 (manuscript at 48).
81 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016).
82 See Jetley & Ji, supra note 58 (manuscript at 10) (“While the extent to which the statutory
rate may drive arbitrageurs to seek appraisal is debatable, our findings are consistent with the notion
that the relatively high current statutory rate does improve the economics for arbitrageurs.”); see also
Daniel E. Wolf et al., Appraisal Rights—The Next Frontier in Deal Litigation?, KIRKLAND M&A
UPDATE (Kirkland & Ellis LLP, New York, N.Y.), May 1, 2013, at 2, http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/
Publications/MAUpdate_050113.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FGF-VCDG] (“In today’s ultra-low interest rate
setting, the accumulating interest payments represent, if not an intriguing stand-alone investment
opportunity, at least a meaningful offset to the extended period of illiquidity and litigation costs
imposed on the dissenting shareholders for the duration of the proceedings.”).
83 Even with the recession of 2008, the average annual return of the S&P 500 between
2006 and 2015 remained 9.03%. Aswath Damodaran, Annual Returns on Stock, T.Bonds and T.Bills:
1928–Current, N.Y.U. STERN SCH. BUS., http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page
/datafile/histretSP.html [https://perma.cc/4WN5-6CX4] (last updated Jan. 5, 2016); see also Jetley &
Ji, supra note 58 (manuscript at 52) (“[I]n cases where the credit of the acquiring company (or the entity
responsible for paying the fair value awarded to the petitioner) is rated ‘BB’ or higher, the statutory
rate appears to overcompensate petitioners for a bond-like claim.”).
84 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1580-81 (“Petitioners are only entitled
to demand an award of interest if they take their claims all the way to trial, which typically takes well
over a year and carries with it the risk that the appraised value could be less than the foregone merger
consideration. The idea that sophisticated investors are pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into
risky appraisal proceedings to chase above-market interest rates simply is not credible.”).
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for investors in appraisal arbitrage claims are not as simple as the judicially
determined fair price of their shares plus the interest rate. Rather, returns must
also exclude enforcement costs, such as attorneys’ and experts’ fees, as well as
the hedge fund’s management and performance fees.85 Additionally, this
interest rate incentive was likely neutralized by the 2016 amendments to
section 262, since acquiring companies can prepay merger consideration to
appraisal plaintiffs, offsetting the statutory interest rate.86
Third, and finally, an increase in appraisal activity may be attributed to
the simple fact that more people, especially sophisticated investors, have
begun to pay more attention to the remedy.87 As previously discussed, the
appraisal arbitrage market has recently become composed of sophisticated,
repeat players with significant amounts of capital at their disposal.88
Furthermore, as opposed to fiduciary duty merger litigation, where lawsuits are
omnipresent and the decision to bring a case is not tied to merit, there is
evidence that the decision to invoke the appraisal remedy is correlated with
litigation merit.89 Thus, the recent prominence of appraisal arbitrage claims
may simply be the result of more smart, wealthy people recognizing that
appraisal can be an attractive investment strategy. However, there is a risk
that, like in the private equity industry, an influx of new entrants and their
attendant capital will increase competition for a limited number of appraisal
claims and result in lower appraisal returns for investors.90
B. Backlash Against the Practice of Appraisal Arbitrage
Although there is debate surrounding the reasons why appraisal claims
have grown, it is undisputed that the practice of appraisal arbitrage has been
met with resistance. Both corporations and defense-side law firms have been
vocal in advocating for restrictive reforms to the Delaware appraisal statute.
The first rumblings for change emerged in the wake of Transkaryotic. One
prominent law firm predicted that the decision “ha[d] the potential to
85 Dan Barufaldi, Hedge Funds: Structure, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/
hedge-fund/structures.asp [https://perma.cc/8SAZ-KVFJ].
86 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016).
87 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1572 (“[T]he rise in appraisal
activity since 2011 appears to reflect a secular increase in interest in appraisal, rather than a mere
cyclical phenomenon tied to the conditions of the merger market.”).
88 See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text.
89 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1556-57 (noting that while “the
evidence suggests that the merits matter” in appraisal litigation, “the evidence suggests the legal merits
are functionally irrelevant” in the decision to bring suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty in a merger).
90 See Steven Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns Persistence and
Capital 24-25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 9807,
2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9807.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ5D-2DJY] (discussing the effect
of new entrants on various types of funds).

2016]

Relying on Merger Price

167

revolutionalize the use of appraisal rights” and warned of the possibility of
“the creation of a new ‘market’ in appraisal rights” that could have a disruptive
effect on the M&A market.91 While the firm may have been prescient, it
nonetheless still took a few more years, the emergence of dedicated appraisal
arbitrageurs, and two high-profile going-private transactions before appraisal
suits came into the spotlight.
In 2010, Merion Capital filed its first appraisal petition.92 In that same year,
a number of other investors who all subsequently became prominent repeat
players in the appraisal arbitrage market also filed claims.93 While these
sophisticated investors were appraisal arbitrage trailblazers and are at the center
of current policy debates, it was two multi-billion, highly publicized goingprivate transactions that really garnered appraisal attention. The first was the
eventually-successful attempt to privatize Dell Inc. by Michael S. Dell and
Silver Lake Partners.94 This transaction proved to be contentious, and the
most prominent of the investors opposed to the deal consideration was
billionaire investor Carl Icahn, who had also been part of the dissenting group
in Transkaryotic.95 As part of a tactic to extract a price greater than that offered
by Michael Dell and Silver Lake, Icahn threatened to oppose the transaction
and exercise his appraisal rights.96 In the end, Icahn did not follow through
with his appraisal threat,97 but the pressure it created forced Dell and Silver
Lake to increase their offer from $13.65 per share to $13.75 per share, plus a
$0.13 dividend.98 This sequence of events provides at least three takeaways.
First, Icahn’s campaign against Dell raised the profile of appraisal actions as
91
92

Latham & Watkins, supra note 71.
See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text; see also Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation,
supra note 5, at 29 (“Merion is reputed to have raised capital devoted solely to the strategy of pursuing
appraisal rights, and Merion’s investments in some targets were so large that it crossed the 5% threshold,
triggering SEC filing requirements. Merion appears to invest in target companies exclusively after the
announcement of a deal, with all Merion purchases of target stock disclosed on the relevant Form 13Gs
occurring after the announcement of the merger transaction.” (footnote omitted)).
93 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 29 (describing a number of funds
that brought appraisal actions in 2010, which have “come to be among the most active appraisal
petitioners in terms of dollars at stake” and which “all appear committed to appraisal as an
investment strategy, making and dissenting on numerous large positions in target companies”).
94 See Michael J. de la Merced, Icahn’s Latest Gamble at Dell: Appraisal Rights, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (July 10, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/icahns-latest-gamble-at-dellappraisal-rights/ [https://perma.cc/GQG3-RGJB] (reporting on the “new tactic” Carl Icahn was employing
by urging his “fellow Dell shareholders . . . to start preparing appraisal rights for their shares”).
95 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 30 (noting that Icahn was “a large
part of the dissenting group in Transkaryotic”).
96 de la Merced, supra note 94.
97 Other investors, however, did seek appraisal. See infra Section IV.C.
98 Miles Weiss, Carl Icahn Withdraws His Appraisal Request for Dell Stake, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
4, 2013, 4:16 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-04/icahn-says-he-withdrewrequest-for-appraisal-on-dell [https://perma.cc/FK7E-9CAE].
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an investment strategy with the widespread media coverage it received.99
Second, Icahn showed that the mere threat of an appraisal action could lead
to a higher ultimate merger price.100 Third, if Icahn had extracted this higher
offer, and nevertheless sought appraisal, Icahn could have used the higher
offer as evidence of unfair bargaining on the part of Michael Dell and Silver
Lake. Icahn could have potentially used this evidence in both the fiduciary
duty and appraisal contexts.
The second of these going-private transactions, a freeze-out merger of
Dole Food Company by its Chief Executive (and controlling shareholder)
David Murdock,101 resulted in Dole management seeking an amendment to
Delaware’s appraisal statute. The appraisal action in In re Appraisal of Dole Food
Company, Inc. was led by funds such as Merion Capital, Hudson Bay Capital,
Magnetar Capital, and Fortress Investment Group, which collectively acquired
nearly twenty percent of Dole stock immediately prior to the deal closing on
November 1, 2013.102
In response—and with one billion dollars on the line—Dole put on a fullcourt press both inside and outside the courtroom, lobbying Delaware
officials to amend the state’s appraisal statute.103 Importantly, Dole is the Port
of Wilmington’s largest tenant, providing the state with steady revenues and
850 jobs, which in theory should have provided Dole with leverage.104 Barely
a month after the close of the Dole privatization, and after considering a move
to Paulsboro, New Jersey, Dole signed a new fifteen-year lease with the Port
of Wilmington.105 While corresponding about the lease, Andrew Lippstone,
99 See, e.g., id. (reporting on Icahn’s threatened appraisal action); see also David Benoit & Ben Fox
Rubin, Icahn Calls on Dell Holders to Seek Appraisal of Shares, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2013, 3:02 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323740804578597433825380870 [https://perma.cc/XE2R
-4T55] (same); de la Merced, supra note 94 (same).
100 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 30 (noting that Dell, Inc.’s
“counsel has since explained that Icahn’s threat to dissent from the transaction prompted the merger
parties to increase the merger consideration by $400 million”).
101 Liz Hoffman, Dole Executives Ordered to Pay $148 Million in Buyout Lawsuit, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dole-executives-ordered-to-pay-148-million-in-buyoutlawsuit-1440686542 [https://perma.cc/83S5-DKSJ].
102 See Tom Hals, America’s Oldest CEO Puts His Dole Buyout to a High-Stakes Test, REUTERS (Aug.
14, 2015, 2:02 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-dole-litigation-idUSKCN0QJ1ZK20150814
[https://perma.cc/E4R4-HCU5] (discussing the investors involved in the appraisal suit); see also Dole
Food Company, Inc. Stockholders Approve Merger, BUSINESSWIRE (Oct. 31, 2013, 3:49 PM), http://www.
businesswire.com/news/home/20131031006489/en/Dole-Food-Company-Stockholders-Approve-Merger
[https://perma.cc/Z7YG-DP42] (stating that the merger was expected to close on November 1, 2013).
103 See Hals, supra note 102 (noting that Dole had taken to “lobbying Delaware officials to
amend” the state’s appraisal statute).
104 Id.
105 See Dole Signs 15-Year Lease with Port of Wilmington, DELAWAREONLINE (Dec. 10, 2013, 6:55 PM),
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/2013/12/10/dole-signs-15-year-lease-with-port-of-wilmington
/3969765/ [https://perma.cc/6VE6-F3X2 ] (announcing the signing of the lease).
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Delaware’s Governor’s general counsel, wrote to Genevieve Kelly, Dole’s
general counsel, expressing a willingness to attempt to amend the corporate
code, stating he was “[h]appy to discuss next steps at [her] convenience.”106 As
the litigation continued, Dole continued to press for reforms that would
prevent hedge funds from buying lawsuits by restricting appraisal rights to
long-term investors only and cutting the statutory interest rate.107 Dole even
threatened reincorporation in a different state if changes were not made.108
Prominent defense firms, many of which also have lucrative transactional
advisory practices, jumped into the fray shortly thereafter. With appraisal
arbitrage creating uncertainty and, thus, a potential decline in the M&A
market, the firms supported Dole’s call for reform.109 These firms constitute
a powerful voice because they advise many Delaware corporations on
corporate transactions, and they also play a prominent role in selecting local
counsel when disputes escalate to litigation in the Chancery Court.110 Deal
lawyers at these firms rushed to publish commentary, arguing that the
practice of appraisal arbitrage is not consistent with the purpose of appraisal
statutes,111 hurts long-term shareholders,112 can lead to unrealistically high
valuations,113 and poses a threat to efficient transactions.114 The target
106
107
108

Hals, supra note 102.
See id. (discussing the specifics of Dole’s lobbying efforts).
See id. (describing a letter in which Kelly “wrote that hedge funds pursuing appraisal ‘show
companies why there is a need to re-incorporate in more business friendly states’” as well as an email
to Reuters in which Kelly stated “we have communicated that Dole will incorporate elsewhere if
changes are not made”).
109 See Liz Hoffman, Wall Street Law Firms Challenge Hedge-Fund Deal Tactic, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6,
2015, 8:53 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-law-firms-challenge-hedge-fund-deal-tactic-14283
62171 [https://perma.cc/GE25-8CAD] (reporting that seven major law firms had sent a letter to the
Council “urging changes to rules governing” appraisal proceedings).
110 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 35 (“[I]t is these New York firms
that often select Delaware counsel, and staying in the good graces of these firms is understandably
crucial to the livelihoods of many Delaware lawyers.”).
111 See Maurice M. Lefkort, Hedge Funds Can Still Manipulate Corporate Law, WHARTON MAG.:
WHARTON BLOG NETWORK (Feb. 12, 2015), http://whartonmagazine.com/blogs/hedge-funds-canstill-manipulate-stock-market-rule/ [https://perma.cc/5MFK-RU2W] (“Appraisal Arbitrage exploits
the failure of the statutes governing appraisal rights to keep up with modern custody practice. Appraisal
rights were designed to protect stockholders in a merger that they felt offered them too low a price. In
Appraisal Arbitrage, an investor buys into a deal for the purpose of exercising appraisal rights.”).
112 See id. (“Allowing this practice to continue will come at the expense of the stockholders who
are not manipulating these rules, and at the efficiency of the mergers and acquisitions marketplace.”).
113 The Growth of Appraisal Litigation in Delaware, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
(Nov. 18, 2013), https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/
wsgralert-delaware-appraisal-litigation.htm [https://perma.cc/SA8G-2K39] (“Management presentations
made to the board in the context of the board considering its alternatives often include an ‘upside’ case
that is admissible for appraisal purposes even if it was unrealistic as a practical alternative.”).
114 See Norwitz, supra note 9 (arguing that there is an “urgent need for legislative reform in
Delaware to ameliorate the risk that appraisal arbitrage—now a multibillion dollar industry—poses
to transactional vitality and shareholder value”).
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audience for the calls for reform was the Council, the body “responsible for
formulating and recommending to the Delaware General Assembly . . .
amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law.”115
When the Council issued its proposed amendments in the spring of 2015,
advocates for reform were underwhelmed. The Council suggested two
amendments, neither of which went as far as the defense-side law firms
wanted.116 First, the Council suggested a de minimis requirement in order to
eliminate nuisance suits: the shareholders seeking appraisal would have to
collectively hold at least one percent of total shares outstanding or one million
dollars’ worth of shares.117 Second, the Council proposed a provision intended
to offset the potential economic incentives of the statutory interest rate:
[A]t any time before the court enters judgment in an appraisal action, the company
surviving the merger can pay to each stockholder seeking appraisal rights an
amount of cash, with interest continuing to accrue only on the amount that is
the difference between that cash payment and the court’s ultimate award.118

In response to this perceived failure to act, seven prominent law firms sent
a letter directly to the Council expressing their disappointment over the
limited scope of the proposed amendments and advocating for further
reform.119 In the letter, the firms expressed their view that “the proposed
115
116
ALERT

See supra note 16.
See Daniel G. Dufner, Jr. et al., Increasing Hostility Towards Appraisal Arbitrage, CLIENT
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS (White & Case LLP, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 2015, at 2,
http://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/alert-increasing-hostilitytowards-appraisal-arbitrage.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JLG-QQKH] (“Despite the expectation that the
proposed legislative reforms will be adopted by the Delaware legislature, they have been criticized as
insufficient to effectively address the problems of appraisal arbitrage . . . .”); see also Abigail Pickering
Bomba et al., Proposed Appraisal Statute Amendments Would Permit Companies to Reduce Their Interest
Cost—Likely to Discourage “Weaker” Appraisal Claims and Make Settlement of “Stronger” Claims Harder,
FRIED FRANK M&A BRIEFING (Fried Frank, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 23, 2015, at 5-6, http://www.
friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/FINAL%20-%203-23-2015%20-%20Proposed%20Appraisal%20Statute
%20Amendments.pdf [https://perma.cc/XHC7-PBM4] (“The Amendments do not include any of the
more far-reaching changes that have been advocated by companies and others seeking to limit the
volume of appraisal claims and the prevalence of appraisal arbitrage, or to ameliorate the burden on
the court of determining ‘fair value’, such as: a limitation on the types of transactions to which
appraisal rights would be applicable; restrictions on the timing for filing an appraisal petition; a
change in the definition of fair value; limiting appraisal rights to stockholders who owned their
shares before announcement of the merger; further requirements with respect to establishing that
shares have not been voted in favor of the merger; or establishing a burden of proof on the parties
(rather than the Chancery Court) to determine fair value.”).
117 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
118 Proposed 2015 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law, supra note 17. It is unclear
what would happen if the court’s ultimate award is less than the merger price.
119 See Seven Firm Letter, supra note 12, at 1-2 (opining that “the proposed legislation [did] not
adequately respond” to the threats created by appraisal arbitrage and advocating for reforms that
they believed constituted a “minimum appropriate solution” to the situation); see also Hoffman, supra
note 109 (describing the letter).
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legislation [did] not adequately respond to the current circumstance in which
decisions of the Delaware courts have opened the door to what has come to
be called ‘appraisal arbitrage.’”120 Quoting a passage from Transkaryotic, the
firms argued that the practice of appraisal arbitrage perverts the true purpose
of the statutory appraisal right.121 The firms suggested amending the statute
such that appraisal rights would only be available to those holding shares
before the record date for the merger vote.122 This solution would remove the
“free option”123 that appraisal arbitrageurs have when deciding to buy into a
lawsuit and restrict the ability to resort to appraisal.
In 2016, the Council recommended almost identical amendments, adding
only that an appraisal suit should not be dismissed if the merger is a
parent/subsidiary merger approved under section 253 or 267 of the DGCL.124
The Delaware legislature responded to this repeated advocacy for reform by
adopting these amendments on June 8, 2016.125 These amendments show that
the Delaware legislature realizes that there is potential for appraisal arbitrage
abuse,126 but the amendments do not go far enough to have meaningful impact.
The amendments prevent nuisance suits, where paying off an opportunistic,
small investor is cheaper than the cost of litigation. The amendments also
negate the financial incentives created by the relatively high statutory interest
rate. However, as one defense-side law firm points out, the amendments do
120
121

Seven Firm Letter, supra note 12, at 1.
See id. at 2 (“[Respondents] argue that this decision will pervert the goals of the appraisal
statute by allowing it to be used as an investment tool for arbitrageurs as opposed to a statutory safety
net for objecting stockholders. That is, the result I reach here may . . . encourage appraisal litigation
initiated by arbitrageurs who buy into appraisal suits by free-riding on Cede’s votes on behalf of other
beneficial holders—a disfavored outcome. To the extent that this concern has validity, relief more
properly lies with the Legislature.” (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting In re
Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007))).
122 This recommendation would effectively undo the Trankaryotic holding. The firms argued,
“We believe that strong equitable arguments can be made to deny appraisal rights to anyone purchasing
after public announcement of a transaction, but at a minimum there is no justification for permitting
holders who purchased their shares after the record date for the vote to seek appraisal as if they were
‘dissenters.’ This approach would fulfill the legislative purpose of protecting stockholders of Delaware
corporations who dissent from a merger that is subject to appraisal rights. It would also reduce the
unseemly claims-buying that is rampant and serves no legitimate equitable or other purpose, but
threatens to undermine transactional certainty and reduce value to shareholders of Delaware
corporations as acquirers, particularly in leveraged transactions, may be forced to factor the enhanced
appraisal risk into their calculations.” Id. at 2-3.
123 See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
124 See Land et al., supra note 21 (describing the Council’s 2016 proposed amendments to the DGCL).
125 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
126 When I refer to abusive appraisal claims, I mean those that are merely speculative
investments, usually without any merit other than a relatively low premia. Appraisal arbitrageurs
may use these claims to extract a settlement above the merger price, and acquiring companies may
acquiesce due to the ex ante uncertainty of appraisal proceedings. See Hoffman, supra note 62 and
accompanying text (noting that four of the five claims that Merion Capital brought were settled).
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“not help buyers manage the deal price risk associated with the exercise of
appraisal rights (including risk related to appraisal arbitrage), which is a longstanding, unaddressed issue in Delaware public company transactions.”127
A way to address the price risk issue is reform aimed at the Chancery Court.
One means of disincentivizng the potentially abusive practice of appraisal
arbitrage is the use of merger price as the best evidence of fair value when
certain conditions hold. The conditions I suggest are (1) unreliable DCF inputs
and (2) a true market test. By shifting to a situation-dependent use of merger
price as fair value, courts will greatly disincentivize bringing meritless
appraisal claims because claimants will no longer be able to profit from that
strategy. At the same time, claimants could bring meritorious appraisal claims
without worrying about this alternative to valuation methods such as DCF,
because if there is a real reason to suspect the merger price was too low, the
court will conduct its own independent analysis. Thus, the concepts of appraisal
arbitrage and the use of merger price as fair value dovetail, presenting an
approach to combat deal price uncertainty when there should be no uncertainty.
III. DELAWARE’S APPROACH TO VALUATION IN APPRAISAL CASES
The sole purpose of an appraisal proceeding is for the court to determine
what minority shareholders are equitably owed for their stock. The DGCL
defines the court’s role:
[The Court of Chancery] shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive
of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of
the merger or consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon
the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining such fair value,
the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.128

This statutory instruction supplies four directives to the courts. First, the
court must determine the “fair value” to be awarded to dissenting
shareholders.129 The term “fair value,” however, is left undefined and is
therefore left to courts’ interpretations. Second, the “fair value” must be
“exclusive of any element of the value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger or consolidation.”130 This provision has been
interpreted to mean that any synergies arising out of a merger must be excluded
127 Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Recent Delaware Appraisal Rights
Developments Address Interest Rate Risk but Leave Certain Transactions Vulnerable on Deal Price
3 (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.davispolk.com/publications/recent-delaware-appraisal-rights-developments
-address-interest-rate-risk-leave-certain/ [https://perma.cc/J5RC-MJVQ].
128 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016).
129 Id.
130 Id.
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from the calculation of “fair value.”131 Third, in addition to “fair value,”
petitioners are also owed interest on their shares.132 The rate of interest is
statutorily defined as the sum of the Federal Reserve discount rate plus five
percent,133 compounded quarterly, starting as of the effective date of the
merger.134 Finally, courts must take into account “all relevant factors” when
determining fair value.135
A. Calculating “Fair Value”
Courts often refer to the legal concept of “fair value” as the “going
concern,”136 “true,”137 or “intrinsic”138 value. In 1950, the Delaware Supreme
Court explained the legal meaning of “fair value”: “The basic concept of value
under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for
that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going
concern.”139 In Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, the Delaware Supreme Court
added that “[t]he dissenting shareholder’s proportionate interest is determined
only after the company as an entity has been valued. In that determination, the
Court of Chancery is not required to apply further weighting factors at the
shareholder level, such as discounts to minority shares for asserted lack of
marketability.”140 Therefore, in determining fair value, a court must pretend
as if the merger had not occurred and calculate what the entire target company
was worth as of the actual closing date. After determining that value, the court
must then award the dissenting shareholders their pro rata share of the total
going concern value.
These guidelines, however, do not provide much guidance to the courts
regarding how to calculate an actual numerical figure representing fair value.
In 1983, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., established
the current approach to measuring fair value, under which, “any techniques
or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial
131 See Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., 847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(noting that “the definition of fair value used in a § 262 proceeding . . . involves policy
considerations, such as the need to exclude synergies in order to value the entity as a going concern”).
132 § 262(h).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See, e.g., Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 356 (describing the court’s “mandate [under section 262]
that the subject company in an appraisal be valued as a going concern”).
137 See, e.g., LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443,
at *9 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (using the term “true value” as a substitute for “fair value”).
138 See, e.g., Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., No. 5233-VCP, 2012 WL 1569818, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr.
30, 2012) (referring to fair value as a company’s “intrinsic value”).
139 Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950).
140 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989).
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community” may be used to calculate fair value.141 This approach appears to
be in harmony with the statutory mandate that “the Court shall take into
account all relevant factors” when determining fair value.142 Accordingly, there
are a number of possible approaches the courts can use when determining fair
value, including a DCF analysis, a comparable companies analysis, a
comparable transactions analysis, or the merger price less synergies.143 Courts
are free to use any, none, or a combination of these approaches.
Since Weinberger, the Chancery Court has grown to favor DCF analysis—
the preferred valuation methodology in the finance community—for its own
determinations of fair value.144 DCF analysis requires the court to value the
target company by discounting all future projected cash flows to their present
value.145 The DCF approach has become favored in appraisal proceedings for
both theoretical and contextual reasons. As a matter of theory, DCF analysis
is universally considered the most accurate way to value a corporation because
it provides a rigorous analytical framework. Additionally, appraisal is often
conducted in the context of a target company that is either private or only
thinly traded. Although this context presents difficulties for a DCF analysis,
since many of its inputs are dependent on a liquid trading market for the
company’s stock,146 a DCF analysis is often still considered more reliable than
a comparables analysis, especially when the target company operates in a

141
142
143

457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016).
Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., A Lawyer’s Guide to Modern Valuation Techniques in Mergers and
Acquisitions, 21 J. CORP. L. 457, 460 (1996) (listing these various techniques “for determining the
value of the assets or shares of a target corporation”).
144 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of the
“Implicit Minority Discount” in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 47 (2007) [hereinafter,
Hamermesh & Wachter, Implicit Minority Discount] (“In the appraisal remedy, the favored method
for calculating the fair value of the corporation is the preferred method in finance for calculating the
fair value of the corporation—that is, the discounted future free cash flows or DCF.”); see also Neal
v. Ala. By-Products Corp., No. 8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990) (describing the
DCF method as “the preeminent valuation methodology”); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No.
7129, 1990 WL 161084, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (“In many situations, the discounted cash flow
technique is in theory the single best technique to estimate the value of an economic asset.”), rev’d
on other grounds, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
145 The Court outlined DCF analysis in ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, explaining, “The DCF
model entails three basic components: an estimation of net cash flows that the firm will generate
and when, over some period; a terminal value equal to the future value, as of the end of the projection
period, of the firm’s cash flows beyond the projection period; and finally a cost of capital with which
to discount to a present value both the projected net cash flows and the estimated terminal or
residual value.” 751 A.2d 904, 917 (Del. Ch. 1999) (quoting Technicolor, 1990 WL 161084, at *7).
146 See Lawrence Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware
Appraisal Law, 2005 J. CORP. L. 119, 125 n.33 [hereinafter Hamermesh & Wachter, Cornfields]
(explaining that “the theory assumes stock trades in liquid capital markets, which rules out closely
held but publicly traded stock”).
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niche market.147 When the target company is either privately held or thinly
traded, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify publicly traded companies
that are sufficiently comparable to provide a reliable valuation.148 Likewise,
similar difficulties arise when trying to identify comparable transactions when
the target company is small and operates in a niche market.149
The DCF methodology, however, is more of an art than a science, as it is
highly sensitive to a number of important assumptions.150 Furthermore, even
the staunchest proponents of the DCF method acknowledge that it is weakest
when used in the typical appraisal context.151 To start, flawed income statement
projections render a DCF analysis useless ab initio. Additionally, other
assumptions, such as the terminal value multiple and appropriate discount rate,
may be extremely difficult to ascertain and vehemently disputed by the parties.
Due to the sensitivity of the DCF methodology to such inputs, accepting one
party’s assumptions over another may lead to wild swings in valuations.
Nonetheless, the burden of proof does not direct the court to favor one party
over another—the court must conduct its own independent analysis.152 Thus,
147 See, e.g., In re Orchard Enter., No. 5713-CS, 2012 WL 2923305, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012)
(“A comparable, or market-based, approach to valuation is rooted in the same intuition as the DCF
method. But rather than directly estimating the future cash flows of the subject company and
reducing them to present value, the market-based methods draw inferences about the future
expected cash flows from the market’s expectations about comparable companies . . . . [But]
[r]eliance on a comparable companies or comparable transactions approach is improper where the
purported ‘comparables’ involve significantly different products or services than the company whose
appraisal is at issue, or vastly different multiples.” (footnotes omitted)).
148 See In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch. 1991) (“The utility of
the comparable company approach depends on the similarity between the company the court is
valuing and the companies used for comparison. At some point, the differences become so large that
the use of the comparable company method becomes meaningless for valuation purposes.”).
149 See Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 56 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting
that an expert’s “comparable company methodology suffer[ed] from the same problem the court
found with his comparable transactions analysis—namely, the companies [he] examined were not
sufficiently comparable to [the target company] to render his work reliable for purposes of a
Delaware appraisal proceeding”).
150 See Richter et al., supra note 4, at 19 (“The methodology most often used by the court to
determine going concern value is a discounted cash flow analysis, which is based in large part on
assumptions and projections that themselves can be highly uncertain, including the company’s
internally generated projections and speculative data about how the company would have performed
if the merger had not occurred.”).
151 That is, when companies are not widely traded. See Hamermesh & Wachter, Cornfields, supra note
146, at 125-26 (noting that finance theory, i.e., DCF analysis, “is in fact weakest in those areas where
appraisal is available”).
152 The court in In re Appraisal of Ancestory.com, Inc. articulated this point, stating, “[Appraisal]
is made particularly difficult for the bench judge, not simply because his training may not provide a
background well-suited to the process, but also because of the way the statute is constructed . . . . A
judge in a bench trial relies . . . on the burden of proof; he holds on to it like a shipwreck victim grasps
a floating deckchair or an ex-smoker hoards his last piece of nicotine gum. Section 262 is unusual in
that it purports explicitly to allocate the burden of proof to the petitioner and the respondent, an allocation
not meaningful in light of the fact that no default exists if the burden is not met; in reality, the ‘burden’
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while DCF analysis is valuable in many cases, there may be certain instances where
the court does not have particular expertise and cannot fall back on default
presumptions to determine the appropriate inputs. Under such circumstances,
the court cannot credibly conduct a DCF analysis, and as a result, has at times
resorted to the merger price achieved in a robust sales process.153
B. Calculating Synergies
Delaware courts, however, cannot entirely defer to M&A markets because
they must calculate the deal synergies that they are statutorily required to
deduct when determining fair value.154 By formulating a structured approach
to deducting synergies after adopting the proposed merger price framework,
courts could create an even greater disincentive for bringing meritless appraisal
claims, as petitioners would receive even less than the merger consideration they
would have received had they not brought the claim.
Synergy, according to one scholar, “is the additional value that is
generated by combining two firms, creating opportunities that would not
[have] been available to these firms operating independently.”155 Synergies are
deal-specific,156 and must be calculated as such.157 Synergies can be divided
broadly into two categories: operating synergies, which typically affect cash
flow, and financial synergies, which can affect cash flow and discount rate.158
Strategic buyers must be distinguished from financial investors, since
strategic buyers are presumed to be able to benefit from synergies while
financial investors are not.159 Thus, in an appraisal action where a financial

falls on the judge to determine fair value, using ‘all relevant factors.’” No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726,
at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015); see also Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 20 (“A
common lament from the members of the Court of Chancery is that the divergent valuations
produced by the dueling experts often put them in an awkward situation in attempting to arrive at
a sensible valuation in a situation where both parties formally share the ultimate burden of proof.”).
153 See supra note 27.
154 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016).
155 Aswath Damodaran, The Value of Synergy 3 (Oct. 30, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=841486 [https://perma.cc/5R3T-YJAZ].
156 See Capturing Synergies in Dealmaking, CAP. AGENDA INSIGHTS (Ernst & Young, N.Y.),
Oct. 2013, at 1, http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_Capturing_synergies_in_dealmaking
/$FILE/EY-Capturing-synergies-in-dealmaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4YD-ZYPZ] (discussing how
“[a]cquirers can use company-specific synergies as a competitive advantage”).
157 See LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443, at
*25 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (rejecting the application of average market premium to determine
synergies because “general data . . . does not tell me anything about this specific transaction, which
must be the focus in a Section 262 action”).
158 Erik P. Gilje, Assistant Professor of Fin., The Wharton Sch., Synergy Valuation (Oct. 30, 2015).
159 See Jan Vild & Claudia Zeisberger, Strategic Buyers v. Private Equity Buyers in an Investment
Process 2 (INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2014/39/DSC/EFE, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2439589
[https://perma.cc/SDG2-594A] (noting that “strategic buyers were considered to have a significant
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sponsor has acquired the target company, the fair value may simply be the
merger price. Conversely, when the acquirer is a strategic buyer, there will be
synergies that the court must back out when appraising the fair value of shares
by using merger price as a starting point.
The academic literature provides a rigorous analytical framework for
valuing different kinds of synergies.160 Nevertheless, in the appraisal context,
determining a synergy deduction from the merger price to arrive at fair value
presents two notable problems: first, valuing synergies is highly dependent
on inputs and assumptions, and it often requires the use of DCF analysis;161
second, after the synergies are valued, it must be determined how much of
them were embedded in the merger price.162
These problems, however, are not insurmountable. Admittedly, it is
somewhat awkward for proponents of merger-price-as-fair-value that the
financial community quantifies most synergies using a DCF analysis.163
However, it is not entirely inconsistent with the merger price approach.
Being forced to use a DCF method for calculating synergies simply presents
courts with a choice. On one hand, the court can just use a DCF method to
value the entire target company, but the downside of this approach is that the
court may believe that the DCF inputs in this scenario are inherently
unreliable. On the other hand, the court can use the merger price as a starting
point when it is skeptical of the inputs needed for a DCF, and then subtract
from it the synergies calculated using the DCF analysis. While this approach
also introduces a potentially flawed DCF analysis into the appraisal process,
it narrows the possible valuation range somewhat because the merger price
acts as an anchor and competing DCFs of synergies will likely yield a smaller
range than competing DCFs of an entire target company.
The second problem is the allocation of the value of the synergies between
the buyer and the seller. Acquirers would not rationally buy other companies
if the entire amount of the expected synergies were included in the merger
price.164 The use of discovery is the solution to the problem of determining
the relative allocation of value. Delaware law permits discovery of pre-suit

advantage over financial investors . . . due to their ability to share with the sellers a portion of the
value generated by the post-acquisition synergies”).
160 See generally Damodaran, supra note 155 (reviewing numerous valuation approaches and
variables).
161 See id. at 10 (valuing operating synergies within a DCF framework).
162 See id. at 10-11 (noting “synergy in a merger may well be worth $2 billion, but paying $3
billion as a premium to get the acquisition done will destroy $1 billion of the acquiring company’s
stockholder wealth”).
163 See id. at 10 (discussing how to value operating synergy using a DCF analysis).
164 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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valuation materials in appraisal proceedings.165 Thus, courts can look at an
acquiring company’s valuation of the target, which certainly quantifies
anticipated synergies. By comparing the acquirer’s valuation of the target
company with synergies, the valuation without synergies, and the ultimate
merger price, courts can triangulate the percentage of anticipated synergy
value imbedded in the merger price. Multiplying the total synergy value—as
determined by the court—with the percentage of synergies embedded in the
deal price, courts can determine independently the appropriate synergy
deduction from the deal price. Additionally, consideration of the acquiring
company’s predicted synergies provides a check for the court in its own
calculation of synergy value.
Calculation of deal-specific synergies is feasible and should not pose a
barrier to courts’ use of merger price as the best evidence of fair value in
accordance with section 262. Delaware courts, however, have yet to put forth
an analytical framework that both describes a deal-specific approach to
valuing synergies and allocates the synergies between the buyer and the seller.
Academics provide a rigorous approach to the former, and discovery is the
best solution to the problem presented by the latter. By creating such a
framework, the use of merger price as the best evidence of fair value is more
credibly aligned with the statutory mandate of section 262.
IV. APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE, MERGER PRICE,
AND DELAWARE PRECEDENT
The practice of appraisal arbitrage and the use of merger price as fair value
dovetail in the case of LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron International Corp.166
The opinion emphasizes the impact of questionable DCF assumptions and a
strong sale process in the appraisal context, with the court ultimately
concluding that merger price represented the best evidence of fair value
under such circumstances.167 The facts and analysis in the decision illustrate the
difficulty courts face in independently valuing companies in certain
circumstances. The decision also contains undertones of disapproval concerning
the practice of appraisal arbitrage, which suggests that policy motivations may
have also been at play in the court’s decision to rely on the merger price.
Further, while the court did subtract out synergies from the merger price, as
it is statutorily obligated to do, the court’s somewhat cursory treatment of the
issue highlights the need for Delaware to strengthen its law governing the
165 See In re Appraisal of Dole Foods Co., Inc., 114 A.3d 541, 549 (Del. Ch. 2014) (rejecting
objections to production of pre-suit valuation-related materials).
166 No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015).
167 See id. at *24 (concluding that “the Merger price [was] a reliable indication” of the
company’s fair value).
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analysis of synergies. This is especially important if Delaware courts wish to
credibly continue placing full weight on merger price in appraisal proceedings.
Finally, the Chancery Court’s recent decisions in In re Appraisal of Dell Inc.168 and
In re Appraisal of DFC Global Corp.169 highlight instances in which this Comment’s
proposed framework is inapplicable.
A. Background of LongPath
Ramtron International Corporation (Ramtron) was “a fabless semiconductor
company that design[ed], develop[ed] and market[ed] specialized semiconductor
memory and integrated semiconductor solutions.”170 Ramtron produced a type
of memory called ferroelectric RAM (F-RAM) and outsourced the
manufacturing of “the silicon wafers used in its products . . . to a separate
company known as a ‘fab’ or a ‘foundry.’”171 F-RAM presents benefits over
other types of memory because it is fast and durable, uses little power, and
“retain[s] memory when power is lost.”172
Perhaps somewhat obviously, Ramtron’s relationship with its foundry was
“vitally important” to its existence since it could not produce F-RAM without
these outsourced silicon wafers.173 In 2009, Fujitsu, Ramtron’s foundry at the
time, “gave Ramtron a ‘last-time buy’ notice,” signifying that it intended to
end its relationship in two years.174 Transitioning to a new foundry is a
complicated process that can take years, as the court described:
[T]ransitioning to a new foundry requires understanding the foundry’s
manufacturing technology and how it interacts with the semiconductors as
designed, then modifying the product design to eliminate any resulting
errors, then completing several rounds of product testing followed by further
design modifications to eliminate any previously undiscovered errors, and
then allowing the customers to evaluate the product before finally moving to
full-scale production.175

When Ramtron received this last-time buy notice, it had already been
attempting over the past five years to establish a second foundry relationship
with Texas Instruments (TI), yet this relationship was not fully formed until
168
169
170

No. 9322–VCL, 2016 WL 3186538 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016).
No. 10107–CB, 2016 WL 3753123 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016).
Ramtron Int’l Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 7, 2012). The term “fabless” refers
to “an electronics business: that has no manufacturing plant; that contracts out the manufacture of
components (esp. microchips) to another company.” Fabless, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2016).
171 LongPath, 2015 WL 4540443, at *1.
172 Id.
173 Id. at *2.
174 Id.
175 Id.

180

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 153

2011.176 Because of its difficult transition from Fujitsu to TI, Ramtron
experienced product shortages and had to put its customers on allocation.177
Customers placed on allocation would only be supplied a reduced percentage
of their total order.178 To avoid this situation from occurring again, Ramtron
tried to develop a new secondary foundry relationship with IBM.179 This
attempt, which spanned from 2009 to 2012, was a failure and cost Ramtron
$33 million, a large sunk cost for a company that had about $66 million in
revenue in 2011.180 However, in July 2012, “Ramtron entered into a
manufacturing agreement with ROHM Co., Ltd. (‘ROHM’)” for ROHM to
serve as Ramtron’s second foundry.181
The combination of putting its customers on allocation and the way
Ramtron’s point-of-purchase revenue recognition system worked resulted in
masked actual demand for Ramtron’s products and an inventory buildup.182
Ramtron recognized revenue on a point-of-purchase basis, rather than a
point-of-sale basis, meaning that it recognized revenue when its products
were shipped to a distributor rather than when its products were purchased
by end users.183 This choice in revenue recognition systems made it more
difficult for Ramtron to forecast future sales.184 Furthermore, because they
were placed on allocation, Ramtron’s customers began over-ordering to “game
the allocation system” in an effort to ensure they received a sufficient supply
of F-RAM, and Ramtron, in turn, began ordering more wafers from TI to
meet this inflated demand.185 The result of this order manipulation was an
inventory bubble for Ramtron, an over-recognition of revenue,186 and a cash
crunch due to increased inventory costs.187 The outcome of these practices
was distorted (and unrealistically high) demand and revenue figures.

176
177
178
179
180
181
182

See id. at *3 (describing this shaky transition).
Id.
See id. at *4 (describing how a customer might be “allocated 80% of its ordered amount”).
Id. at *3.
See id. (detailing Ramtron’s failed IBM investment and its associated costs).
Id.
See id. at *4 (noting the “chain of events” that led to a “massive inventory bubble, over
recognition of revenue, and resulting cash crunch” for Ramtron).
183 Id. at *3.
184 See id. at *4 (explaining that the point-of-purchase method increases the difficulty of forecasting
future actual demand because of the “buffer” distributors provide).
185 Id.
186 There was over-recognition because Ramtron forced excess inventory into distribution
channels, a practice known as “channel stuffing,” and its point-of-purchase recognition system
allowed Ramtrom to recognize revenue at that point in time. Id.
187 Id. Ramtron repeatedly missed or was forced to renegotiate its loan covenants due to
shortfalls in cash because of these increased inventory costs. Id. at *5.
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While Ramtron was facing these difficulties, Cypress Semiconductor
Corporation (Cypress) began pursuing the company.188 “On March 8, 2011,
Cypress made a nonpublic written offer . . . of $3.01 per share,” representing a
thirty-seven percent premium over the closing price of Ramtron’s stock.189
Ramtron later rejected the offer as inadequate, but still desperately needed capital
to fund its excess inventory.190 Because there was a dearth of willing lenders,
Ramtron launched a secondary public offering in July 2011 of 4,750,000 shares,
representing approximately twenty percent of outstanding shares, at $2 per
share.191 Indicative of Ramtron’s struggles was the fact that the price of its
secondary offering was lower than the market price of its stock in July 2011,
which fluctuated between $3.12 per share and $2.19 per share.192 Even after
this equity infusion, Ramtron continued to face severe cash shortages.193
Despite being initially rebuffed, Cypress continued to try to acquire
Ramtron. On June 12, 2012, Cypress publicly declared that it wanted to
acquire Ramtron for $2.48 per share, which represented the same thirty-seven
percent premium as its previous, nonpublic offer.194 In response, Ramtron
rejected the offer as inadequate, announced that it was exploring strategic
alternatives, and decided to generate long-term management projections.195
Importantly, Ramtron’s management had been newly installed and had never
before created multiyear projections, but rather had prepared five-quarter
forecasts.196 On June 14, two days after the announcement of Cypress’s offer,
Balzer, Ramtron’s CEO, told his executive team by email that he wanted a
“product by product build up, with assumptions, for it to hold water in the
event of a subsequent dispute.”197 Richards, Ramtron’s CFO, later testified
that he understood that the long-term projections were to be used to market
the company to a white knight and as inputs for a DCF analysis.198
Meanwhile, “Cypress commenced a hostile tender offer for Ramtron at
$2.68 per share” on June 21.199 Ramtron’s board rejected this offer and

188
189
190
191
192

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Ramtron International, GOOGLE FIN., https://www.google.com/finance/historical?cid=
656974&startdate=Jul+1%2C+2011&enddate=Jul+31%2C+2011&ei=ngXnVrmoJM2aecz8iqgM [https:
//perma.cc/6CDY-XEPB] (reporting a monthly high closing price of $3.12 per share on July 19, 2011,
and a monthly low closing price of $2.19 per share on July 28, 2011).
193 LongPath, 2015 WL 4540443, at *5.
194 Id. at *6.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at *7.
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“recommended that the shareholders not tender their shares.”200 Yet, soon
thereafter, Ramtron issued second quarter earnings substantially below
expectations.201 Ramtron had offered public guidance for 2012 revenue of $70
million, yet, at its current pace, it was on track to miss this target by at least $10
million.202 “Merriman Capital, the only analyst covering Ramtron, downgraded
the” company’s rating to “neutral” and predicted that its stock price could fall
below $2 per share.203 Although there are many potential explanations for
Ramtron’s decline in performance, the court found that “operational shortcomings
of Ramtron were the primary cause of the decline in sales.”204
Despite Ramtron’s poor performance, Cypress increased its tender offer to
$2.88 per share.205 Ramtron’s board again rejected this bid as inadequate,
despite its inability to find another buyer.206 Seemingly without any other
option, representatives of Ramtron began meeting with representatives of
Cypress on September 12, 2012.207 These active negotiations resulted in a final
transaction price of $3.10 per share, and on September 18, the parties entered
into a merger agreement.208 The merger was approved by a shareholder vote on
November 20, 2012.209
Approximately one month after the announcement of the merger, LongPath
Capital, LLC (LongPath) began acquiring Ramtron shares.210 Ultimately,
LongPath acquired 484,700 shares211 and timely filed an appraisal action on
December 11, 2012.212 While LongPath could not have known then which
method the Chancery Court would use to value its shares, there were some
indications prior to LongPath even filing its suit that the merger price—and
not a DCF analysis—may be the best indication of fair value.
To start, Longpath should have known that the Ramtron sale process was
robust and that Ramtron’s financial projections were untrustworthy. At the
very least, Longpath had access to Ramtron’s Preliminary Proxy Statement,
which was filed with the SEC on October 19, 2012—the same time that
Longpath began buying up Ramtrom shares.213 Ramtron’s Preliminary Proxy
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Id.
Id. at *8.
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Id. at *1.
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Ramtron Int’l Corp., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 3 (Oct. 19, 2012).
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makes clear that the Ramtron board retained competent financial and legal
counsel and attempted to run a robust sales process before ultimately
concluding that a sale to Cypress was in the best interest of its shareholders.214
This process included Ramtron reaching out to and negotiating with various
third parties and repeatedly rejecting offers from Cypress over the course of
several months before the parties finally agreed upon a merger price.215
Moreover, the Preliminary Proxy Statement could have also indicated to a
keen observer that Ramtron’s projections were likely to be suspect in the eyes
of Delaware law. Most importantly, Cypress’s bid prompted management to
initiate a “process in generating an updated financial model in connection with
Ramtron’s strategic plan.”216 Further, given its sizable investment in Ramtron,
LongPath almost certainly would have read the reports of Merriman Capital,
the only analyst covering the company. After Ramtron released disappointing
second quarter 2012 earnings, Merriman Capital suspended its target price for
Ramtron’s stock and stated that it “simply c[ould]n’t figure out how to model
this company consistently at the current time.”217 Thus, while LongPath may
have genuinely believed that the merger price undervalued Ramtron, a DCF
analysis did not seem like a strong way to make this argument.
B. Holding and Reasoning of Longpath
Ultimately, the court decided that the merger price, less synergies, was
the fair value of LongPath’s shares.218 The court came to this conclusion
because the “inputs [were] unreliable” for a DCF analysis and “the sales
process . . . was thorough.”219 Specifically, the court noted four reasons why
the assumptions underlying the DCF analysis in this case were fatally flawed.
First, the court found management’s projections to be unreliable because they
were prepared after Cypress made an offer, giving Ramtron management an
incentive to skew the projections upwards.220 The court concluded that “the
214 After receiving Cypress’s renewed bid on June 12, 2012, Ramtron’s board authorized the
retention of Shearman & Sterling as legal counsel and Needham & Company as financial advisor. Id. at
20. Additionally, Ramtron formed a “Strategic Transaction Committee” to “assist [the] board of directors
in considering any acquisition proposals from Cypress and any transactions that may be considered as
alternatives to Cypress’s indication of interest.” Id. at 17. Finally, Ramtron’s board determined the merger
was “advisable, fair to and in the best interests of Ramtron and its stockholders.” Id. at 3.
215 Id. at 21-31.
216 Id. at 20.
217 LongPath, 2015 WL 4540443, at *13.
218 Id. at *1.
219 Id.
220 See id. at *11 (noting that the “projections were prepared in anticipation of potential
litigation, or, at least, a hostile takeover bid” and that “one of the purposes of the projections was to
serve as a marketing tool” in search of a white knight, which gave “the management team an incentive
to err on the optimistic side”).
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projections were not prepared in the ordinary course of business,” and as such,
they “facially lack[ed] the indicia of reliability that generally have led
Delaware courts to defer to management projections.”221 The “final nail on
the coffin for the Management Projections [was] that Ramtron did not rely
on them in the ordinary course of its business,” as it used a different set of
projections to manage Ramtron’s finances.222
Second, the management projections were unreliable because they lacked
forecasting ability; they were prepared by a new management team that did
not have a deep understanding of the business or experience making long-term
projections.223 Ramtron’s own management recognized its limitations with
forecasting,224 and, in evaluating Ramtron’s recent forecasting record, the court
concluded “that management, even under its traditional forecasting system, was
of middling quality when it came to forecasting Ramtron’s future business.”225
Third, the projections did not fit with the realities of the F-RAM
business. The management projections assumed that Ramtron would be able
to transition to ROHM wafers in sixty days, even though it took seven years
for Ramtrom to transition from Fujitsu to TI.226 Additionally, transitioning to
a new foundry required a substantial cash investment, yet Ramtron was cash-poor
at the time of the merger.227 Finally, the projections defied historical trends,
indicating a period of “previously unknown prosperity” immediately following a
time of enormous difficulty—a “dramatic turnaround . . . despite no underlying
changes that would justify such an improvement of business.”228
Finally, the projections relied on 2011 and 2012 revenue figures that were
distorted by customer allocation issues and channel stuffing—in essence,
revenue manipulation.229 The court pointed out that these issues resulted in
fundamentally flawed projections: “[i]f 2011 and 2012 are used as base years in
forecasting, but those years include inflated revenue because of either overordering by customers placed on allocation or channel stuffing, then the reliability
of the projections is affected.”230 The court declined to correct for this issue.231
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Id. at *11.
Id. at *17.
See id. at *18 (concluding that the management projections were unreliable in part because
they “were prepared by a new management team”).
224 See id. at *13 (“Ramtron’s management also recognized its own limited success in forecasting.”).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at *16.
229 Id. at *14-15.
230 Id. at *15.
231 See id. (“I do not consider it productive (even assuming it is feasible) to attempt to quantify
how much in extra revenue Ramtron recognized in 2011 or 2012 based on these factors.”).
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Given the numerous flaws in management projections, the court instead
looked to merger price as a possible indication of fair value. The court
recognized that while the merger price does not necessarily always equal fair
value,232 in the appropriate situation, where there has been a robust sale
process, Delaware courts have viewed merger price as evidence of fair value:
[I]n the situation of a proper transactional process likely to have resulted in an
accurate valuation of an acquired corporation, this Court has looked to the merger
price as evidence of fair value and, on occasion, given that metric one-hundred
percent weight. In an oft-quoted passage, then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs wrote:
“The fact that a transaction price was forged in the crucible of objective market
reality (as distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought process of a
valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence that the price is fair.” Similarly,
Chief Justice Strine, then writing as a Vice Chancellor, noted: “[O]ur case law
recognizes that when there is an open opportunity to buy a company, the
resulting market price is reliable evidence of fair value.”233

The mere fact that only one company had made a bid for Ramtron did not
affect the court’s determination that a robust sales process had occurred.234 In
the court’s view, Ramtron had conducted a thorough sale process by repeatedly
rejecting Cypress’s offers and doing everything in its power to solicit other
buyers.235 All of these factors led the court to accept the merger price as the
best evidence of fair price.236
Taken together, the fact that the projections were irreparably tainted and
that there was a robust sale process would have alone been enough for the
court to use the merger price as the exclusive best evidence of fair value. The
court, however, took the additional step of expressing its displeasure with the
practice of appraisal arbitrage and, more generally, the use of litigation to
determine a company’s value. This additional discussion suggests that in
using merger price as the best evidence of fair value, the court may have
been motivated not by LongPath’s substantive arguments, but by policy
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See id. at *20 (offering a short-form merger as one such situation).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
See id. at *21 (noting that the court was “not aware of any case holding that a multi-bidder auction
of a company is a prerequisite to finding that the merger price is a reliable indicator of fair value”).
235 See id. (“Ramtron could, and repeatedly did, reject Cypress’ overtures. Simultaneously,
Ramtron actively solicited every buyer it believed could be interested in a transaction. The Company
provided several of those potential buyers with the much-vaunted Management Projections. No one
bid. LongPath contends that the lack of other bidders indicates a flawed process. I disagree. Any
impediments to a higher bid resulted from Ramtron’s operative reality, not shortcomings of the
Merger process.”).
236 See id. at *20 (concluding that “the Merger price offers the best indication of fair value”).
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considerations.237 Indeed, the court criticized LongPath’s investment strategy
and implied that LongPath’s arguments were absurd:
LongPath asks this Court to adopt its $4.96 figure and conclude that the
market left an amount on the table exceeding Ramtron’s unaffected market
capitalization. This would be a significant market failure, especially in the
context of a well-publicized hostile bid and a target actively seeking a white
knight. But, LongPath itself is a market participant. It bought its shares after
the announcement of the Merger, thereby effectively purchasing an appraisal
lawsuit. Although such arbitrage can be profitable on the merits when flawed
deals undervalue companies, LongPath invested an amount so small that,
even if I accepted its position and concluded that Ramtron’s true value at the
time of the Merger was somewhere in the range of $4.96 per share, this
lawsuit is likely a less-than-break-even proposition for LongPath after
considering its litigation expenses.238

Based on its investment strategy, it is unlikely that LongPath actually
wanted to litigate this case, but rather bought into the lawsuit to use the threat
of appraisal to extract higher consideration.239
Further, the court has expressed a dim view of buying into lawsuits just
to extract a profit: “Much has been said of litigation-driven valuations, none
of it favorable.”240 As the court pointed out, valuations generated for trials
strain credibility.241 In so noting, the court implied that valuations generated
by a robust sales process should be preferred over the expert valuations that
are presented in court. Extending the court’s commentary to its logical
conclusion, the court seems to indicate that it is willing and able to clamp
down on appraisal suits when inappropriately brought.

237 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 24 (“[O]ne potential
explanation—though perhaps too cynical—is that the recent spate of defeats the Delaware Court of
Chancery has handed to appraisal petitioners was in part a shot across the bow of appraisal
specialists, designed to staunch a perceived gold rush, and in part designed to let the appraisal
alarmists—and the legislature—know that the court has appraisal well in hand, without the need for
radical legislative reforms.”).
238 LongPath, 2015 WL 4540443, at *9.
239 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting that four of Merion Capital’s five appraisal
claims had settled before trial).
240 Longpath, 2015 WL 4540443, at *9.
241 See id. at *9 n.78 (“In appraisal proceedings, the battling experts tend to generate widely
divergent valuations as they strive to bracket the outer limits of plausibility.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., Inc., 114 A.3d 541, 557 (Del. Ch. 2014)));
see also Finkelstein v. Liberty Digital, Inc., No. 19598, 2005 WL 1074364, at *13 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25,
2005) (“Men and women who purport to be applying sound, academically-validated valuation
techniques come to this court and, through the neutral application of their expertise to the facts,
come to widely disparate results, even when applying the same methodology.”).
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Because of the statutory requirements of section 262(h), the court was not
finished in determining fair value; rather, it still had to back out any synergies
that arose because of the merger. The court followed its mandate; however, it
only provided a cursory explanation for its acceptance of one party’s synergy
figure over the other’s.242 Moving forward, for the Delaware courts to be able
to credibly use merger price as the best evidence of fair value consistent with
section 262, the courts must better articulate an analytical framework for
assessing synergies. As shown in Section III.B., this is a feasible task.
C. Dell and DFC Global
The Chancery Court had been on a streak of allotting one-hundred percent
weight to merger price as evidence of fair value in appraisal cases.243 In the
summer of 2016, however, the court deviated from this trend. In In re Appraisal
of Dell Inc., the Chancery Court refused to give any credence to the merger
price and entirely relied on DCF analysis,244 while in In re Appraisal of DFC
Global Corp. the Court opted for an equal balancing of DCF analysis, comparable
companies analysis, and transaction price to arrive at its determination of fair
value.245 These decisions, nevertheless, do not spell the death of the exclusive use
of merger prices as the best indication of fair value in certain cases. Dell and DFC
Global are readily distinguishable from decisions like LongPath, and do not
undercut the framework advanced by this Comment: that the Court of Chancery
should defer to merger price when there is a true market test and the inputs for
DCF analysis are unreliable.
Neither Dell nor DFC Global had both conditions that this Comment
suggests must be present for an acquiring company to be shielded with use of the
merger price as the best evidence of fair value. In particular, neither case would
be afforded protection because there was not a true market test in either case.
In Dell, the court determined that the fair value of Dell’s shares was $17.62,246
approximately twenty-six percent higher than the merger consideration of $13.65
per share.247 The court eschewed the merger price and relied exclusively on DCF
analysis to arrive at its determination of fair value.248 While acknowledging and
citing recent decisions that relied exclusively on merger price, the court
distinguished the case at hand, in part, by noting that all of the decisions

242 See Longpath, 2015 WL 4540443, at *25-26 (accepting, without significant explanation,
LongPath’s proposed synergy figure).
243 See supra note 27.
244 No. 9322–VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *51 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016).
245 No. 10107–CB, 2016 WL 3753123, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016).
246 Dell, 2016 WL 3186538, at *51.
247 Id. at *12.
248 Id. at *51.
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deferring to merger price “either involved a more active pre-signing market
check or the process was kicked off by an unsolicited third-party bid.”249
When seeking to sell the company, Dell only reached out to three
potential bidders, all financial sponsors.250 Financial sponsors are generally
believed to be able to pay less for companies because they do not benefit from
the same sort of synergies as strategic buyers,251 and they are constrained by
return thresholds for their investors.252 Two of the three financial sponsors
quickly dropped out, eliminating price competition and leaving Dell
negotiating with one other party.253 The court found that this set of facts
resulted in “a lack of meaningful price competition during the pre-signing
phase.”254 The court was also dismissive of the effectiveness of the go-shop
during the post-signing phase.255 Thus, because there was not a robust market
test in Dell, the company would not have been afforded the merger price
protection proposed in this Comment.
In DFC Global, the court held that the fair value of the company’s shares
was $10.21, $0.71 above the merger price.256 The court reached this conclusion
through an equal “blend of three imperfect techniques: a discounted cash flow
model incorporating certain methodologies and assumptions each expert made
and some of [the court’s] own, the comparable company analysis respondent’s
expert performed, and the transaction price.”257 While the court acknowledged
that there was “an arm’s-length process and a robust bidding environment,”258
it refused to afford one-hundred percent weight to the merger price because
the transaction “was negotiated and consummated during a period of significant
company turmoil and regulatory uncertainty, calling into question the reliability
of the transaction price as well as management’s financial projections.”259 Thus,
because market conditions undermined the reliability of the sales process and
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Id. at *23 n.13.
Id. at *4, *8, *37.
See supra Section III.B.
See Dell, 2016 WL 3186538, at *29 (“What the sponsor is willing to pay diverges from fair
value because of (i) the financial sponsor’s need to achieve IRRs of 20% or more to satisfy its own
investors and (ii) limits on the amount of leverage that the company can support and the sponsor
can use to finance the deal.”).
253 Id. at *36-37.
254 Id. at *37.
255 Id. at *37-44.
256 In re Appraisal of DFC Global Corp., No. 10107–CB, 2016 WL 3753123, at *1 (Del. Ch.
July 8, 2016).
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
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resulting merger price,260 DFC Global would not have been afforded merger
price protection under this Comment’s proposed framework.
V. A (LONG)PATH FORWARD
Although they have not articulated a formal test for when to use merger
price as the best indication of fair value in the appraisal context, Delaware
courts have tended to take a two-pronged approach in the third-party merger
context: first, there must be reason to doubt the reliability of the inputs needed
to conduct a DCF; and second, there must have been a robust sale process of
the target company.261 This approach first provides a rationale for bucking the
DCF default, and then identifies a reasonable alternative to valuation. I
contend that when these two conditions hold, the Chancery Court should
automatically defer to merger price as the best indication of fair value.
Some scholars fundamentally disagree with the use of the merger price,
even less synergies, as the best evidence of fair value. They argue that thirdparty sale value is equivalent to the opportunity cost of the asset, which is
analytically distinct from the concept of going concern value.262 They point out
that, in fact, “opportunity cost as a theoretical concept actually results in a lower
value” than going concern value, because “[i]n equilibrium, all value-enhancing
transactions have already taken place, so that the value to the next best user is
260 See id. at *21-22 (“By the same token, the market price is informative of fair value only
when it is the product of not only a fair sale process, but also of a well-functioning market. . . . Th[e]
same uncertainty inherent in the projections underlying the discounted cash flow analysis [due to
the unpredictable regulatory environment] was present in the sale process.”).
261 For example, looking to reliability, the court in LongPath stated, “The utility of a DCF
ceases when its inputs are unreliable; and, in this instance, I conclude that the management
projections that provide the key inputs to the petitioner’s DCF analysis are not reliable . . . . I
conclude that the sales process in this instance was thorough and that the transaction price less
synergies provides the most reliable method of determining the fair value of the petitioner’s shares.”
LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443, at *1 (Del. Ch.
June 30, 2015). Regarding the sales process, for example, the court in In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com,
Inc. stated that “[b]ecause the inputs here . . . are problematic . . . , and because the sales process
here was robust, I find fair value in these circumstances best represented by market price.” No. 8173VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at *23 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (footnote omitted).
262 See, e.g., Hamermesh & Wachter, Implicit Minority Discount, supra note 144, at 31 (“The
definition of value used by economists is a version of third-party sale value—that is, the opportunity
cost of the asset in its next-best use. The term opportunity cost is used because, if the inputs were
not used by the firm, they could be deployed elsewhere. The difference in value of the firm’s inputs
in an alternative use represents its opportunity cost. The opportunity cost concept is not a measure
of going concern value, but a measure of next-best-use value.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Lawrence
A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts, 50
B.C. L. REV. 1021, 1040 (2009) (“The flaw of the third-party sale value argument is that it assumes
that assets are generally deployed inefficiently so that a higher use is readily available in an appraisal
setting. One reason that the great majority of firms are not up for sale at every moment is that
higher bidders do not naturally lurk in the shadows waiting for the ‘for sale’ sign to be posted.”).
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actually lower than current use value.”263 While the logical coherence of this
argument is indisputable, it overlooks the fact that these scholars’ favored
approach to valuation, the DCF methodology, may be nearly impossible in
certain situations.264 The extended discussion of the LongPath decision above is
intended to illustrate just how difficult it can be for courts to conduct their own
independent valuations in certain circumstances. Thus, in such instances,
courts must choose between conducting an inherently flawed DCF analysis and
deferring to a market outcome. When choosing between these imperfect
alternatives, courts should elect to embrace the third-party sale option.
Additionally, the rationale behind deferring to the merger price in
instances where there was a true market test for the company is consistent
with longstanding tenets of Delaware law.265 In general, when decisions are
informed, voluntary, and unconflicted, Delaware courts favor deferring to
corporate decisionmakers, rather than imposing their own judgment.266 In the
appraisal setting, Delaware courts have invoked a principle analogous to the
business judgment rule when accepting the merger price as the best evidence
of fair value.267 The existence of a robust sales process gives courts confidence
that the eventually agreed upon transaction price was fair, since potential
buyers with actual dollars at stake vetted the target company with the goal of
263
264
265

Hamermesh & Wachter, Cornfields, supra note 146, at 134.
See supra notes 151–153.
See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1602 (“Allowing courts to declare the
fair value of a company where there has been no showing of any process-based wrongdoing . . . flies in the
face of the usual strong presumption—in Delaware, at least—that competitive markets are the best
arbiters of economic value.”). Others have also made this point, stating, “While the only consideration
in an appraisal proceeding is the determination of fair value (and wrongdoing by the target board or flaws
in the sales process are legally irrelevant for these purposes), the transactions that attract appraisal
petitions generally involve some basis for a belief that the deal price significantly undervalues the
company—that is, transactions involving controlling stockholders, management buyouts, or other
transactions for which there did not appear to be a meaningful market check or significant minority
shareholder protections as part of the sales process.” Richter et al., supra note 4, at 21-22.
266 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (articulating a preference
against “a court . . . imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation”); In re
Morton’s Rest. Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 663 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2013) (stating that “when
disinterested approval of a sale to an arm’s-length buyer is given by a majority of stockholders who have
had the chance to consider whether or not to approve a transaction for themselves, there is a long and
sensible tradition of giving deference to the stockholders’ voluntary decision”).
267 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (noting “the difficulties, if not outright incongruities, of a law-trained judge
determining fair value of a company in light of an auction sale, aided by experts offering wildly
different opinions on value”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d
340, 359 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“For me (as a law-trained judge) to second-guess the price that resulted
from [the market’s opportunity to price the target company directly as an entity] involves an exercise
in hubris and, at best, reasoned guess-work.”); Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., No. 7046, 1991 WL
29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991) (“The fact that a transaction price was forged in the crucible of
objective market reality (as distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought process of a
valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence that the price is fair.”).
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putting forth a competitive offer.268 Potential acquirers, of course, are
expected to conduct their own DCFs as part of their individual valuations.
However, these DCFs are not performed with an eye toward litigation, but
rather as a starting point in a negotiating process with the target company.269
Sophisticated investors are also arguably better at performing DCF analyses
than law-trained judges. The final merger price, in a competitive auction
process, is the outcome of real-world bargaining that represents what a buyer
is actually willing to pay for a company, while a judge-conducted DCF
performed by the courts is simply the court’s best estimate of what a company
was hypothetically worth.270
Increased use of merger price as the best evidence of fair value could have
a dramatic effect on appraisal arbitrageurs’ investment strategy. Courts may
embrace merger price because of the rationales detailed above or out of a
desire to fight the practice of appraisal arbitrage itself,271 but no matter the
courts’ motivation, the outcome for appraisal arbitrageurs is the same—they
cannot profit from this investment strategy. This movement away from DCF
analysis, therefore, could be the death knell for appraisal as a speculative
investment strategy, at least in the third-party merger context when the
underlying assumptions for a DCF analysis are suspect and there was a robust
sales process. When these two conditions hold, any appraisal claims are at
best inefficient, and, at worst, frivolous. For an appraisal arbitrageur to buy
into a lawsuit in such a situation would be pure financial speculation because
he does not have any reliable financial data to support an argument that the
fair value is higher than the merger price. Financial markets, not courtrooms,
are the appropriate forums for such speculation. The likely outcome of this
shift to a merger price safe harbor would be reductions in frivolous appraisal
claims and in the threat of appraisal to beneficial deals, as well as increased
disclosure to demonstrate that the sales process was thorough.

268 See, e.g., Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 359 (“The benefit of the active market for [the target
company] as an entity that the sales process generated is that several buyers with a profit motive
were able to assess these factors for themselves and to use those assessments to make bids with actual
money behind them.”).
269 See In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., Inc., 114 A.3d 541, 549 (Del. Ch. 2014) (granting
motion to compel production of valuation-related materials in an appraisal case because “prelitigation valuations are relevant to the central issue in the proceeding” and “also are relevant to
issues of [sic] such as the appropriate inputs and considerations for valuation methodologies”).
270 See Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 359 (“For me (as a law-trained judge) to second-guess the price that
resulted from that [robust sales] process involves an exercise in hubris and, at best, reasoned guess-work.”).
271 See supra note 237.
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CONCLUSION
Not only is it statutorily permissible to use merger price as the best
evidence of fair value, under certain circumstances, it is preferable. If there is
a thorough sales process and the inputs required for a DCF analysis are
unreliable, then the merger price is almost certainly a better indication of fair
value than a court’s own independent DCF analysis. This approach not only
incentivizes greater disclosure regarding the sale process of the target
company, but also it deters appraisal arbitrage when it is likely frivolous.
When a DCF analysis is unreliable and there was a fulsome sale process,
appraisal arbitrageurs are likely doing no more than engaging in financial
speculation. Rather than protecting long-term shareholder interests, appraisal
arbitrageurs may simply be looking for a settlement above the merger price.
The Chancery Court has the institutional capacity to deter these unwanted,
speculative, and potentially abusive appraisal claims; indeed, through the use
of a merger price framework, this Comment argues that the court is better
suited to solve this problem than the legislature is, even considering the
recently enacted amendments.
By adopting the proposed merger price framework and formulating a
method for deducting synergies, courts can lessen the uncertainty of the
appraisal process, deter meritless appraisal claims, and, hopefully, increase the
frequency of deals that are beneficial to long-term shareholder interests.

